Universal Cash Transfers Reduce Childhood Obesity Rates by Watson, Brett et al.
Universal Cash Transfers Reduce Childhood Obesity Rates
Brett Watson1†, Mouhcine Guettabi1‡, Matthew Reimer1§
April 15, 2019
Abstract
We evaluate the impact of universal income on childhood obesity. While the goals of im-
plementing universal income are many, its influence on childhood obesity is of particular
interest given the growing obesity epidemic and its future threat to global public health.
We use evidence from Alaska’s universal income program, the Permanent Fund Dividend
(PFD), which has provided annual, unconditional, and universal income to Alaskan resi-
dents for over thirty-five years. We use both survey and administrative data to evaluate how
the availability of unconditional resources at an early developmental stage, in terms of PFD
payments to the child, affects a child’s body mass index (BMI). Using date-of-birth eligi-
bility cut-offs as an identification strategy, we find that an additional one thousand dollars
in PFD payments decreases the probability of an Alaskan child being obese by as much as
4.5 percentage points. Back-of-the-envelope calculations for Alaska suggest these reduction
may avert 500 cases of obesity and achieve medical cost savings of $2-10 million per year.
These findings highlight just one of the potential social benefits of universal income and the
potential it has as a tool for addressing the obesity epidemic.
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1 Introduction
There has been increased interest in universal basic income (UBI) and its role in our econ-
omy’s future and the welfare of its citizens. Many politicians and thought leaders have
argued for the implementation of a universal and unconditional cash transfer program on
a national scale (Alba, 2016), citing its potential to improve economic security (Thigpen,
2016) or as a substitute for existing welfare programs (Murray, 2008). Universal transfers
are provided to all residents on a long-term basis, regardless of income, while unconditional
payments are those distributed with no “strings attached” (Marinescu, 2017). Several coun-
tries, such as Finland and India, have recently implemented UBI experiments (Khosla, 2017;
Authors and Research at Kela, 2016). The United States has also shown interest in UBI, as
demonstrated by an ongoing random control trial aimed at understanding the effectiveness
of universal income on people’s well-being across several dimensions, such as employment,
social networks, and health (Weller, 2017). On the political front, the Democratic Party
nominee for the 2016 US presidential election, Hillary Clinton, considered integrating a UBI
proposal into her campaign platform (Matthews, 2017). The program was intended to be
named “Alaska for America” given the inspiration it drew from the Alaska Permanent Fund
Dividend (PFD), which is an annual universal and unconditional income payment provided
to all Alaska residents. While skeptical of costs, conservative thinkers have also written favor-
ably about UBI’s potential as a replacement for complex means-tested and strings-attached
programs (Tanner, 2015).
Despite the growing interest in UBI, there is little accumulated knowledge regarding its
effects on the well-being of recipients. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of universal and
unconditional cash transfers on childhood obesity. Although universal income is expected
to influence well-being in several different ways, we focus on childhood obesity given the
growing obesity epidemic and its future threat to global public health (Lancet, 2011).
We use the Alaska PFD to evaluate how universal and unconditional income affect child-
hood obesity. The PFD is the world’s only continuous universal income program, providing
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ongoing annual unconditional payments to all residents (subject to minor eligibility rules)
since 1982. The PFD amount varies year-to-year according to the investment earnings of
the Alaska Permanent Fund, the state’s sovereign wealth fund, and establishes an income
floor below which the cash income of residents cannot fall. This cash payment represents
a non-negligible portion of Alaskans’ earnings, and is particularly important in rural areas
where economies lack economic bases and are still a mixture of subsistence and a small formal
economy (Goldsmith, 2010). The program is very popular and the public expects it to run in
perpetuity. The PFD is distributed to all residents of the state—both adults and children, as
well as green-card holders and refugees—regardless of income or wealth, making it universal.
Further, residents are not required to meet any conditions before receiving the PFD, nor are
they restricted in how they spend the PFD, making it unconditional. Thus, the Alaska PFD
is the closest example to a UBI program worldwide and provides a unique opportunity for
understanding how unconditional and universal payments influence well-being.1
While the goals of UBI are many, its influence on childhood obesity is of particular in-
terest given that the obesity rate in the U.S. has more than doubled (from 5.0% to 12.4%)
among children aged 2-5 years since 1980 (Ogden et al., 2014). Childhood obesity has been
associated with type II diabetes mellitus, hyperlipidemia, atherosclerosis, hypertension, de-
pression, nonalcoholic fatty liver disease, and obstructive sleep apnea (Daniels, 2006; Dietz,
1998; Krebs et al., 2003; American Academy of Pediatrics, 2003). Additionally, there is
evidence that obese children are considerably more likely to be obese as adults, which may
negatively affect labor market outcomes (Lindeboom et al., 2010; Cawley, 2015), and early
childhood medical interventions have significant impacts on adolescent education outcomes
(Bharadwaj et al., 2013; Chyn et al., 2019). Childhood obesity is also responsible for signifi-
cant health care costs (Biener et al., 2017): the incremental lifetime direct medical cost from
the perspective of a 10-year-old obese child relative to a 10-year-old normal-weight child
1Other recent empirical studies of the PFD focus on the impact of the PFD on consumption and spending
(Hsieh, 2003; Kueng, 2018), crime (Watson et al., 2019), and employment (Jones and Marinescu, 2018; Bibler
et al., 2019; Feinberg and Kuhn, 2018)
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ranges from $12,660 to $19,630 (Finkelstein et al., 2014).
Income, and how it interacts with obesity, is an important part of almost all policy in-
terventions. In theory, additional income could lead to an increase or decrease in childhood
obesity. Higher income, for example, can prevent weight gain by allowing parents to sub-
stitute healthier, more costly, food for cheaper energy-dense food or by increasing demand
for a child’s health care. On the other hand, additional income could promote weight gain
by allowing children to consume more calories and spend more time in sedentary pursuits
(Cawley, 2015). Several studies have found that conditional cash transfers improve health
and nutritional outcomes for children in early life (Rasella et al., 2013; Reis, 2010; Schmeiser,
2012; Fernald et al., 2008); however, it is likely that these benefits are achieved in part due to
the conditions imposed by the program. Existing studies of unconditional income payments
and obesity have found mixed results: Swedish lottery payments have been shown to reduce
obesity across income groups (Cesarini et al., 2016), but dividends from a tribal casino have
been found to increase obesity among the poorer households with non-offsetting reduction
in obesity for wealthier households (Akee et al., 2013). These payments, however, do not
stem from a universal program and focus on obesity outcomes for young adults, as opposed
to children. Chung et al. (2016) show the Alaska PFD has large, positive effects on birth
weights, particularly for mothers with less education.
The Alaska PFD presents an ideal setting to understand the impact of unconditional,
anticipated, and universal cash on children’s obesity at a very early age. Indeed, the PFD
may be more conducive to influence childhood obesity compared to other cash transfer
programs. The PFD payments we study are nominally assigned to the child; thus, a labeling
effect may induce parents to spend this cash disproportionately on the child relative to other
sources of income (Kooreman, 2000). The income effect of the PFD also causes mothers to
reduce their labor supply (Bibler et al., 2019), enabling more maternal time with children.
Schaller and Zerpa (2019) show maternal job loss can improve children health through such
a pathway, while Jo (2018) finds a similar effect acting on childhood obesity. Finally, the
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PFD is universal and is thus distributed across the entire income distribution, including
segments of the population for which obesity may be more responsive to income payments
(Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2009; Jo, 2014).
We determine the causal effect of universal income receipt on childhood obesity by ex-
ploiting quasi-experimental variation in the cumulative amount of PFD received by a child.
We find that a one-thousand dollar PFD payment significantly decreases the probability
of being obese as a child by as much as 4.5 percentage points, which equates to a 22.4%
reduction in the number of obese 3-year-old Alaskans. Consistent with theory (Lakdawalla
and Philipson, 2009), the effect of the PFD on obesity is nonlinear in household income:
middle-income households are particularly responsive to the PFD payments while there is
no detectable response from high- and low-income households. Back-of-the-envelope calcula-
tions suggest that a one-thousand dollar investment per child avert 500 annual obesity cases
in Alaska, resulting in obesity-related medical expenditure savings of $2-10 million before
those children turn 18. Importantly, our results suggest that UBI could have far-ranging
benefits to society and has potential for combating the growing obesity epidemic.
2 Background, Data, and Research Design
2.1 The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend
Since 1982, the Alaska has distributed annual dividend payments to residents based on the
earnings of the state’s sovereign wealth fund, the Alaska Permanent Fund. The fund was
established in 1976 and capitalized with royalties generated from oil production. Today,
its value stands at over 63 billion dollars with investment in a diverse set of assets. The
annual dividends paid from fund earnings represents a non-negligible portion of Alaskans’
income. For example, between 2000 and 2016, the average PFD size per-person was $1,600,
representing 6.28% of overall household income. PFD payments are determined by a formula
that is based on a rolling average of the Fund’s income over five years in order to produce
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more stable dividend amounts from year to year. It is important to note that the Fund is
well-diversified across different regions and asset classes. State oil revenue, which originally
capitalized the fund, currently represent only 2-3% of annual fund additions; since 1985,
investment returns are the main growth mechanism. The Fund’s returns, and thus the size
of the PFD payments, are therefore not necessarily reflective of Alaska’s economic conditions.
2.2 Identification Strategy
The influence of income on childhood obesity is challenging to identify empirically: if house-
hold income is determined by unobserved factors that also influence a child’s weight, then
the estimated relationship between income and obesity will be spurious (Kuehnle, 2014).
We are able to address this issue by exploiting two forms of quasi-experimental variation
in income. First, an Alaskan resident adult may sponsor a newborn child to receive a PFD
if the child is born before December 31st of the qualifying year. Because of this rule, a
child born on December 31st will receive one more PFD than a child born one day later on
January 1st (Fig. 1). So long as a child’s date-of-birth has no independent effect on obesity,
the additional PFD amount received from being born before the eligibility cut-off can be
considered exogenous. Second, the PFD has seen considerable variation in size over the last
two decades: the PFD has averaged approximately $1,600 per person, with a high of $3,200
in 2008 and low of $900 in 2012 (all in nominal terms). As a result, the cumulative amount
of PFDs received by a particular age will differ across children. The exogenous nature of
these two sources of income variation supports a causal interpretation of our estimated effect
of the PFD on childhood obesity.
2.3 Data
Our analysis relies on linked survey and administrative data called the Alaska Longitudi-
nal Child Abuse and Neglect Linkage Project (or ALCANLink), an ongoing project which
combines two surveys conducted by the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services—
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the Pregnancy Risk Assessment Monitoring System (PRAMS) survey and the Childhood
Understanding Behaviors Survey (CUBS)—with administrative data from vital records and
the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend Division.2 The PRAMS survey samples one-sixth of
all mothers delivering live births in Alaska and collects information on pre- and post-natal
behaviors and outcomes of mothers and their newborn children. The survey is administered
by mail two to six months after birth (with follow-up by phone) and has historically had
a ∼65% response rate. The survey oversamples mothers of low birth weight children and
Alaska Native people. CUBS is an Alaska-specific program developed as a three-year follow-
up survey to the PRAMS survey to understand the behavior and outcomes of toddlers. It
is administered two months after their child’s third birthday to all PRAMS survey respon-
dents who remain in-state. Linked vital statistics includes information on birth weight, birth
date, presence of birth defect, use of c-section, place of birth, race, ethnicity, mother’s age
at delivery, smoking status, martial status, mother height and weight, gestational diabetes,
drinking indicator, and Kessner index. Figure 1 illustrates how birth timing and the date
a mother returns the CUBS follow-up survey determines the number of PFDs that children
accumulate before a mother records a child’s obesity at age three.
Our data is a subset of the ALCANLink project, covering children who were the subject
of a CUBS follow-up survey. These data cover children born between January 2009 and
December 2011, have mothers who were sampled by (and responded to) the PRAMS survey
two to six months later, and include mothers who received and responded to CUBS between
2012-2015. The time period of coverage for the current data contained in ALCANLink was
chosen principally for administrative reasons. Data from the Permanent Fund Division allow
us to observe the application status of each child in each year between birth and their CUBS
survey, which provides the information to calculate the accumulated dollars of dividend
received by each child. Table 1 shows the number of children in each obesity category.
Our primary outcome of interest is the obesity status of children at the age of three,
2We obtained these confidential data via data use agreement with Alaska DHSS.
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the age at which the follow-up survey (CUBS) is administered. We adopt the conventional
measure of child obesity, which is based on body mass index (BMI) referenced to Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) growth charts.3 The CDC defines four weight cate-
gories for children’s BMI: underweight, normal weight, overweight, and obese, with category
cutoffs based on the 5th, 85th, and 95th percentiles, respectively, of the U.S. population in
the 1970s. Mothers report their children’s height and weight in CUBS, and BMI and obe-
sity status are calculated before inclusion in ALCANLink. While our analysis is focused on
obesity outcomes (≥95th percentile), we also examine the prevalence of overweight children
(≥85th percentile). Table 1 describes the distribution of three-year-old children across these
BMI classes. Table 1 includes all children who’s obesity status was calculable (n=1225),
while our main analysis locks the sample with a number of controls where some data are
missing (n=885).
We categorize control variables into three groups: child characteristics, mother charac-
teristics, and early nutrition characteristics. We test the balance for each control variable
across the number of PFDs a child receives at the time that CUBS is administered (Tables
A.1, A.2, and A.3). For the child characteristics, balance is rejected for: child age, with
younger children (indicating a prompt response to the CUBS follow-up survey) receiving
fewer dividends; and birth weight, with children receiving one PFD having a lighter birth
weight than children receiving two or three PFDs. Mother characteristics are balanced for
all control variables. Critically, we observe no statistically significant difference in race, age,
or income across mother’s whose children receive one, two, or three PFDs. For early nutri-
tion characteristics, children receiving a single PFD tend to have later introductions to solid
foods and liquids other than breast milk.
3BMI is calculated as weight/height2.
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2.4 Empirical Model
We estimate the probability of being obese at age three (t = 3) using the following model:





where Obi is a binary variable equal to one if a child is obese (i.e., BMI is ≥95th percentile
cutoff) and zero otherwise; TotalPFDi is the total amount of PFDs (in 1,000 dollars) the
child received on or before a mother completes CUBS; Xi is a vector of control variables:
demographics and child, mother, and early nutrition characteristics (Tables A.1, A.2, and
A.3); Λ(·) denotes the logit function; and the parameter β is the coefficient of interest. To
explore whether the effect of the PFD on childhood obesity varies across income groups, we
also interact the total amount of the PFD received by a child with a categorical variable
indicating household income (less than $25,000; between $25,000 and $75,000; and above
$75,000).4 Note that we do not use birth-month fixed effects given that a significant portion
of our variation stems from the number of PFDs received, which is driven by birth month.
The marginal effect of the PFD is the reduction in the probability of being obese at age
three from a marginal increase in the PFD:
R = P (Obi,t=3 = 1)[1− P (Obi,t=3 = 1)]β. (2)
3 Results
The accumulation and investment of universal and unconditional income generates significant
and meaningful reductions in childhood obesity in our sample. We find that an additional
$1,000 in accumulated PFD reduces the relative probability of being obese as a three-year-
old to 0.691, which is equivalent to reducing the average probability of being obese by
5.2 percentage points, all else equal (Table 2, column 1). The estimates in Table 2 are
4These income groups roughly define terciles for our sample.
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sample average treatment effects and do not account for the over-sampling of low-birth-weight
children and Alaska Native mothers on the part of the survey design. Using survey sample
weights slightly reduces the marginal effect of the PFD to 4.5 percentage points. Our results
hold even when using different constructions of obesity status by comparing obese children to
only normal-weight children (column 2); obese and overweight children to both normal and
underweight children (column 3); or overweight and obese children to only normal-weight
children (column 4). Furthermore, the marginal effect of the PFD increases by ∼1 percentage
point when moving from columns (1-2) to columns (3-4), which implies that the PFD also
lowers incidences of overweight status. We test our primary model specification across a
number of alternative dependent and independent variable specifications and present these
results in Table 3. The effect of the PFD on obesity and overweight status is negative and
statistically significant at the 95% level for all models that condition on child characteristics
and nutrition or mother characteristics.
We also find evidence of a nonlinear relationship between household income and the effect
of the PFD on childhood obesity (Table 4). Specifically, we find that the obesity-reduction
effect is driven by middle-income families (those households earning between $25,000-$75,000
per year). We find no evidence of an effect of the PFD for low- and high-income families. The
same analysis across a more refined disaggregation across the eight income categories in the
survey instrument reveals a relatively smooth U-shaped relationship between the PFD effect
and household income (Table 5 and Figure 2). As before, the PFD’s effect is statistically
significant and negative for the middle-income group ($25,000-$75,000), but generally not
for high- and low-income families.
3.1 Robustness Checks
The causal interpretation of our results relies on the quasi-experimental nature in how PFD
payments are accumulated over a child’s first three years. Nonetheless, there are four poten-
tial threats to our identification strategy, which we address in this section. First, a parent
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may forget or opt out of applying for a child’s PFD for reasons that may be related to the
child’s weight. Second, parents could also be strategic in timing their child’s conception in or-
der to be eligible for an additional PFD. If these decisions are associated with a child’s home
and nutritional environments, then the estimated effect of the PFD will be biased. Third,
there is evidence that birth season is associated with a mother’s characteristics (Buckles and
Hungerman, 2013); for example, winter births are disproportionately realized by teenage and
unmarried women. Thus, children may be systematically heavier or lighter depending on the
month in which they are born. Fourth, there are several federal tax benefits—e.g., Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC), child tax credit, dependent deduction, etc.—that a child born
before December 31st will qualify for when filing taxes the following spring (2-3 months after
birth). In contrast, a child born after January 1st will not qualify for such benefits until
the following year. As a final robustness check, we compare our estimates to a reference
distribution of placebo effects, where the amount of PFD accumulated by a child at the age
of three is artificially reassigned across all subjects in the sample.
3.1.1 Application Status
A parent may forget or opt out of applying for a child’s PFD for reasons that may be related
to the child’s weight. If these decisions are correlated with home and nutrition environments
to which the child is exposed, then the estimated PFD effect will be biased. We conduct
two tests to address this concern. First, we condition on whether parents applied for every
dividend a child was eligible for. The model results, Table 6, with the added control are quite
similar to those of our primary specification. Second, we employ a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) approach to address the potential endogeneity in application status.5 We test three
different instruments for TotalPFD: the number of years a child was eligible to receive a
PFD (either 2 or 3), the total dollar value of PFD a child was eligible to receive over the
period, and an over-identified model using both the number and average dollar value of PFD
5Note that since 2SLS is a linear estimator, the second stage results will differ from the those of the logit
model estimated in our primary specification.
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a child receives. The results of the 2SLS estimations are presented in Table 7. There is a
strong relationship between the instruments in the first stage as we reject the hypothesis of
weak instruments at any conventional level. The Wu-Hausman test suggests that the value
of cumulative PFD received is exogenous to application status. Further, the Sargan test
for endogeneity enabled by our over-identified models in columns 3 and 6 indicates that we
can’t reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. The coefficients in Table
7 are qualitatively similar to our estimates of the marginal effects estimated in our logit
regressions. Altogether, these robustness checks provide support that our results are not
invalidated by any PFD application selection bias.
3.1.2 Endogenous Birth Timing and Birth Season
Birth season may also be related to obesity outcomes in ways that are unrelated to receiving
the PFD. If our control variables do not capture these effects, our estimates of the PFD’s
effect on obesity will be biased. While it may be tempting to address this issue by using
birth-month fixed effects, such effects are subsumed by the variation we exploit in the birth-
date cutoff (Jan. 1) in our identification strategy. Approximately 70% of the variation we
observe in the cumulative PFD a child receives is explained by birth month, with the balance
split between year of birth, application status, and mother’s survey response timing. Thus,
rather than relying on birth-month fixed effects, we address this concern by controlling for
strategic birth timing and trimming our sample to include only the fourth and first quarters
of the year (October through March).
It is useful to distinguish between two possible sources of birth season endogeneity. The
first is strategic birth timing, where parents manipulate conception timing in order for chil-
dren to be born in a particular season, potentially to receive an additional PFD. Endogeneity
arises if these parents have unobservable characteristics that are correlated with obesity (e.g.,
“savvy” parents may also be more health conscious). We are able to construct a variable
from the survey that controls for such strategic timing. The PRAMS survey asks directly
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if a mother was: a) trying to get pregnant at the time she became pregnant, and b) if
the mother was happy with the pregnancy timing (or whether she would have preferred to
be pregnant soon or later). Our constructed variable for strategic timing “Intended Timing
Preg.” is the intersection of a “yes” response to each of these two questions—i.e., the mother
was trying to become pregnant and she was happy with the timing. While this control is
positively associated with obesity, its inclusion has no meaningful effect on the PFD effect
of interest (Table 8), suggesting that any strategic birth timing does not result in increased
PFD accumulation.
The second source of birth-season endogeneity arises if birth season itself has an effect on
obesity. To address this concern, we narrow our sample to only the 1st and 4th quarters of the
year, which include months (October-March) that have similar characteristics (temperature,
daylight hours, etc.). The results of estimating the model on this narrower sample are
presented in Table 9. Dropping approximately half the sample decreases the precision of
the PFD estimate, but increases their magnitude. In Table 10 we present results from a
particularly aggressive specification, using the control variables for application status and
strategic birth timing along with the trimmed sample (Q1 and Q4 only). This specification
leads to the largest estimate of the PFD effect in our study, nearly a 8.5 percentage-point
decrease in obesity, suggesting that our primary estimate is mostly driven by children born
during the winter months.
3.1.3 Tax Benefits
Birth timing around the birth-date eligibility cutoff (Jan. 1) also defines child tax benefits, as
well as PFD receipt. This potentially conflates our estimate with tax benefits that families
receive sometime during the late winter/spring as part of their annual tax return. Such
tax benefits are determined by whether a child is born during the tax year, income, marital
status, and the number of other dependents/children in the family. The marginal tax benefit
reflected in CUBS will also depend on CUBS survey timing relative to when families file
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income tax returns. Figure 3 shows a timeline of the tax return dates and PFD payout dates
by a child’s birth month. The interactions of the various timings define four groups. Group
one, children born in January or February, is eligible for between two and three tax returns
and is eligible for two PFDs. Group two, children born in March through June, is eligible for
three tax returns and between two and three PFDs. Group three, born in July, is eligible for
three to four tax returns and between two and three PFDs. The final group, born August
through December, could receive between three to four tax returns and is eligible for three
PFDs. We attempt to flexibly model tax effects by adding the following interaction term
(along with its primals) to the model in Eq. 1: TaxPFDGroup × Income ×Married ×
Dependants, where TaxPFDGroup denotes the group assignment based on birth month
(as described above). Since income tax benefits also depend on household income (Income),
marital status (Married), and the number of other children and dependants (Dependents),
we interact birth group with these variables to create a flexible way to disentangle the effects
of income tax benefits from the effect of the PFD.6 We note that by controlling for the number
of eligible PFDs in TaxPFDGroup, we are removing an important source of variation from
our estimate of the PFD’s effect on obesity. Specifically, in this model we are exploiting
only the annual variation in PFD amount and the actual application status of the children.
The results presented in Table 11 show that the while the magnitude of the PFD’s effect on
obesity increases (with a decrease in precision), the inference remains relatively unchanged.
3.1.4 Placebo Tests
As a final robustness check, we compare our estimates to a reference distribution of placebo
effects, where the amount of PFD accumulated by a child at the age of three is artificially
reassigned across all subjects in the sample. Obtaining similar or larger estimates when the
6Income is a categorical measure of self reported income, categorized into 5 bins. Married is a binary
variable equal to one if the mother is married when responding to PRAMS. Dependants is the number of
people a mother reports as being dependent on Income, such as themselves, their partners, children, other
family members, etc. While dependent children under 18 are especially important for tax treatments, such
as the EITC and the child tax credit, the number of total dependents is also relevant for the purpose of
exemptions.
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accumulated PFD is artificially reassigned across subjects would suggest that we have found
our effect by chance (Abadie et al., 2010). Such permutation tests are based on the fact
that, under the null hypothesis of no effect, arbitrarily reassigning accumulated PFD across
subjects should have no influence on the incidence of obesity. As demonstrated in Figure 4,
our estimate (the point) lies below the 0.5 percentile of the distribution of placebo effects,
providing additional evidence of the significance of our effect.
3.2 Estimated Savings in Medical Expenditures
To get a sense of the economic significance of our results, we simulate how the estimated effect
of the PFD on childhood obesity might persist through adolescence and reduce associated
medical expenditures for an average Alaskan child and the average cohort of Alaskan-born
children. The simulation, described in complete detail in Appendix A, accounts for the
fact that as children mature, they transition into and out-of obesity, which attenuates the
age-three treatment effect. While obesity in adolescence has been shown to persist into
adulthood, we focus only on the benefits accrued before age 18 since these are incurred
soonest after our treatment effect. Additionally, while many studies have shown that there
are substantial market and non-market costs associated with obesity apart from direct med-
ical expenses (Dee et al., 2014; Goettler et al., 2017), we focus narrowly on the medical costs
since indirect costs are typically measured for adults.
We estimate the difference in medical expenditures of the average cohort of Alaskan-
born obese three-year-olds, relative to their cost had they not been obese. We measure this
difference over a 15-year horizon, from four through seventeen years of age. To determine
the effect of the PFD on obesity-related medical-cost savings, we hypothetically reduce the
amount of PFD received by a three-year-old by one-thousand dollars and predict how many
additional obesity cases are created at age three, how these persist into adolescence, and
how a child’s cumulative medical expenses are impacted by the age of seventeen.
The expected medical-cost savings for a child at age t > 3 from a marginal increase in
14




P (Obt = 1|Obt=3 = 1)− P (Obt = 1|Obt=3 = 0)
]
× R̂ (3)
where c is the annual medical cost of being obese (relative to not being obese), R̂ is the
reduction in the probability of being obese at age three given a marginal increase in the
PFD, and the expression in the brackets represents the relative influence of a child’s obesity
status at the age of three (Obt=3) on the likelihood of being obese at age t.
7 We estimate
a child’s medical-cost savings between the ages of four and seventeen from the PFD for a
cohort of size N by summing the savings in Eq. 3 across all N individuals and ages.
Estimates of the relative medical cost of being obese c are taken from the literature
(Biener et al., 2017) and R̂ is the predicted marginal effect of the PFD on a child’s obesity
status (Eq. 2). The probability of a child being obese at age three, P (Obt=3 = 1), is
determined for Alaska from the CUBS sample in combination with the PRAMS survey-
design weights. These probabilities for an individual three-year-old are then multiplied by
the average size (11,000) of the 2009-2011 Alaska birth cohorts (Martin et al., 2011, 2012,
2013).
To project a child’s obesity status over a 15-year horizon, we employ a standard modeling
approach from the literature and estimate transition probabilities to and from obesity-status
categories. We estimate transition probabilities as a function of a child’s initial obesity status
and their mother’s BMI (Whitaker et al., 1997):







where Obi,t=3 denotes a child’s obesity status at age three; BMI
mtr
i denotes the BMI of the
child’s biological mother, averaged over the child’s observed lifetime; and γ is a vector of
parameters to be estimated. Since CUBS is not a longitudinal study, we do not observe the
7See Appendix A for a derivation of this result.
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long-run obesity outcomes of the children in our sample. Instead, we estimate Eq. 4 using the
National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Young Adults. Confidence intervals for our
estimated medical-cost savings are obtained via a bootstrapping procedure (See Appendix
A for additional details regarding the cost-savings projections).
Table 12 presents the results from our medical-cost-savings simulaiton exercise. Obesity
rates for Alaskan-born three-year-olds between 2012 and 2014 were 0.203, which translates
into 2,230 Alaskan obesity cases. Extrapolating the estimated marginal effect of the PFD
(-4.5 percentage points) to the Alaska three-year-old population, we find that 500 cases
of obesity were averted from an additional $1,000 in PFD payments, which is equivalent
to a 22.4% reduction in the number of obese three-year-olds. Drawing from the literature
(Cawley, 2010), obese children incur $1,400 more in medical expenses per year relative to
children who are not obese, on average. Assuming that all averted three-year-old obesity
cases remained non-obese through the age of seventeen, a $1,000 universal income payment
would result in medical-cost savings of $10.3 million for the average Alaska-born cohort,
respectively, which equates to $920 per person. If we assume instead that obesity is not
fully persistent (i.e., the effect of the initial cash transfer on obesity decays with age), we
find medical-cost savings that are approximately one-quarter of the previously estimated
size—$2.3 million for the average Alaska-cohort, respectively, which translates into 21 cents
in savings for every dollar spent.
4 Conclusion
The use of universal and unconditional cash transfers to address the fast-pace of economic
change has gained momentum, but we have yet to understand its consequences on health
and well-being. We contribute to furthering this understanding by focusing on an issue that
is expected to be a significant threat to global public health (Lancet, 2011). Indeed, obesity
has become an epidemic throughout the world, with the United States leading the way with
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an obesity rate of approximately 36.5% among U.S. adults between 2011-2014. According
to Cawley (2010), the estimated annual cost of treating obesity in the U.S. for the adult
non-institutionalized population is $168.4 billion, or 16.5% of national spending on medical
care.
We find that a one-thousand dollar unconditional and universal income payment decreases
the probability of being obese as a child by 4.5 percentage points, which equates to a 22.4%
reduction in the number of obese 3-year-old Alaskans. The averted obesity cases result
in average medical-cost savings between 20 and 92 cents per PFD dollar by the age of
17, depending on how the effect of the cash transfer is assumed to persist over time. These
estimates represent a lower bound since they do not account for lifetime medical-cost savings,
they do not include additional medical-cost savings that might be realized from receiving
PFD payments beyond the age of three, and they ignore the indirect effects of obesity, which
tend to be larger than the direct ones that we estimate (Dee et al., 2014).
The magnitude of our estimates are larger than some previously reported in the liter-
ature on benefit transfers and obesity (e.g., Jo, 2018; Schmeiser, 2012; Akee et al., 2013;
Cesarini et al., 2016). However, these differences can be largely explained by three distinct
features of the PFD and the timing of cash transfer. First, while classic economic theory
assumes the fungibility of money, evidence from the behavioral economics literature sug-
gests that mental accounting might drive PFD recipients to experience a labelling effect,
whereby money is mentally assigned to particular forms of consumption based on how it is
acquired. Because the PFD payments we study are assigned to the children (rather than
the parents or the household), parents may spend this cash disproportionately on children
relative to other sources of income. Indeed, previous research has demonstrated that “child
benefit” payments issued in the Netherlands are disproportionately spent on child expendi-
tures (Kooreman, 2000). Second, the PFD is distinct from wage subsidy payments, such as
the EITC, which tend to draw mothers into the labor force, and in turn, decrease a mother’s
home production, particularly activities like preparing healthy meals or physical activities
17
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with children (Jo, 2018). In contrast, the PFD has been demonstrated to have the reverse
effect, allowing mothers to substitute unearned for earned income and decrease their labor
supply (Bibler et al., 2019). Third, our study population is younger and has a higher base-
line obesity rate than those of past studies. Bharadwaj et al. (2013) and Chyn et al. (2019)
find early health interventions can have significant impacts on educational outcomes later
in life. In the context of obesity, younger children (particularly under the age of three) are
much more responsive to changes in nutrition than older children (Schroeder et al., 1995;
Martorell, 2017). Finally, the PFD is distributed to households across the entire income
distribution, and thus, our sample is comprised of families with relatively larger household
incomes. The samples of previous studies are comprised of relatively poor families with
average incomes ranging from $19,000-$24,000 per year (Schmeiser, 2012; Akee et al., 2013;
Cesarini et al., 2016). Consistent with our findings, these studies find a small (if any) effect
of unearned income or wage subsidy payments on obesity for this income group. In contrast,
the average household income in our study is $45,000, with approximately 40% of our sample
lying in the household income category ($25,000-$75,000) that is responsible for driving our
estimated effect. Thus, the universal nature of the PFD is a rare opportunity to explore
how all segments of the population respond to cash transfers, not just those portions of the
population that have been targeted in previous programs.
Identifying the mechanisms through which additional income reduces obesity is of great
interest for policy (Currie, 2009; Kuehnle, 2014). Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to
conduct a thorough evaluation of how additional PFD resources are used by families.
While our study has important implications for universal income programs, we are some-
what limited by the nature of survey data, such as non-response bias and measurement error.
For example, we find that not reporting height and/or weight (used to calculate our BMI
measure) tends to be correlated with observable characteristics such as race and income.
Future research would benefit from administrative data with more systematic collection.
Our investigation documents the causal relationship between universal cash transfers and
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childhood obesity. The medical cost savings we estimate are considerably larger than those
found in most school interventions (Cradock et al., 2017), but are much smaller than the
ones obtained from sugar sweetened beverage excise tax, and nutrition standards (Gortmaker
et al., 2015). It is important to note, however, that the reductions we observe are a byproduct
of the unconditional cash transfer and not one of its stated goals; thus, the benefits we identify
are only a small portion of the intended effects of universal income and should not taken as
a complete cost/benefit accounting of such a policy. Nevertheless, our results make it clear
that universal income has the possibility of improving children’s health, which can have
long-lasting monetary and non-monetary benefits. It is also encouraging that these health
improvements are a result of a non-targeted obesity intervention. It is therefore possible
that universal and unconditional cash transfers have far-ranging benefits to society that go
beyond those intended by a UBI program.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Sampled three-year-old children, by BMI weight classification
Underweight Healthy Overweight Obese
Percentile <5th 5th-85th 85-95th >95th
N Children (Unweighted) 75 679 190 281
% of Children (Unweighted) 6% 55% 16% 23%
% of Children (Weighted) 6% 54% 15% 24%
Table includes all children who’s obesity status was calculable (n=1225)
while our main analysis locks the sample with a number of controls where
some data are missing (n=885). Fractions are calculated with (weighted)
and without (unweighted) survey sample design weights.







Case 1: Children born before May receive 2 
PFDs before CUBS follow-up 
Case 2: Children born after 
June receive 3 PFDs before 
CUBS follow-up 
Case 3: Children born May, June, July 
receive 2 or 3 PFD, depending on 
date mother completes CUBS 
PRAMS is a survey is administered 4-6 months after birth, CUBS is a survey is
administered 2-7 months after 3rd birthday. Top case: child born Jan-Feb will only receive
2 PFDs before mother returns CUBS survey. Middle case: children born Aug-Dec will
receive 3 PFDs before mother returns CUBS survey. Bottom case: children born Mar-July
may receive 2 or 3 PFDs, depending on the CUBS survey date.
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Table 2: Un-weighted Estimated Effect of Total PFD ($1,000s) on the Probability of Being
Obese and Overweight as a Three-year-old Child
Risk of being: ≥95th ≥95th ≥85th ≥85th
Compared to: <85th 5th-85th <85th 5th-85th
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit coefficient −0.370∗∗∗ −0.380∗∗ −0.360∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.152) (0.117) (0.120)
Odds ratio 0.691∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.104) (0.082) (0.085)
Marginal effect -0.052 -0.058 -0.065 -0.064
Observations 885 698 885 830
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Columns (1) and (2) measure the effect of the PFD on the
risk of being classified obese (BMI ≥ 95th percentile for sex/age)
relative to all other weights (BMI < 85th percentile, column 1)
or only normal weight children (5th-85th percentile, column 2).
Columns (3) and (4) are estimates for both obese and overweight
children relative to all other weight classes (column 3) or only
normal-weight children (column 4).
Table 3: Logit Coefficient Estimates for Different Control Variable Specifications
Obese Obese & Overweight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total PFDs (’000$) −0.055 −0.172 −0.304∗∗ −0.268∗∗ −0.370∗∗∗ −0.149 −0.224∗∗ −0.303∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗∗ −0.360∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.120) (0.132) (0.129) (0.140) (0.094) (0.103) (0.112) (0.108) (0.117)
Logit ME at mean -0.009 -0.027 -0.044 -0.039 -0.052 -0.035 -0.046 -0.057 -0.055 -0.065
Child characteristics X X X X X X X X
Mother characteristics X X X X
Pre/post natal nutrition X X X X
Observations 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1-5) measure the effect of the PFD on the risk of being
classified obese (BMI ≥ 95th percentile for sex/age) relative to all other weights (BMI < 85th percentile). Columns (6-10) are estimates for
both obese and overweight children relative to all other weight classes. Child characteristics are listed in Table A.1, mother characteristics
are listed in Table A.2, pre/post natal nutrition variables are are listed in Table A.3.
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Table 4: Odds Ratios of Estimated Effect of Total PFD ($1,000s) on the Probability of Being
Obese and Overweight as a Three-year-old Child for low, middle, and high income terciles
Risk of being: ≥95th ≥95th ≥85th ≥85th
Compared to: <85th 5th-85th <85th 5th-85th
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PFD 0.888 0.935 0.914 0.958
(0.186) (0.254) (0.191) (0.212)
PFD x 25-75K 0.5 0.461** 0.546** 0.518**
(0.148) (0.161) (0.148) (0.146)
PFD x >75k 1.056 1.063 0.916 0.89
(0.367) (0.422) (0.283) (0.284)
Observations 885 698 885 830
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Estimates presented are the results of PFD × Income
tercile interactions.
Table 5: Estimated Effect of Total PFD ($1,000s) on the Probability of Being Obese and
Overweight as a Three-year-old Child, by Income Group
Obese Obese & Overweight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PFD x 10,000 0.100 −0.151 −0.357 −0.226 −0.396 0.319 0.170 0.039 0.225 0.076
(0.252) (0.290) (0.301) (0.292) (0.297) (0.249) (0.295) (0.304) (0.309) (0.317)
PFD x 10,000-14,999 0.296 0.219 0.412 0.117 0.388 −0.258 −0.458 −0.358 −0.709 −0.536
(0.440) (0.486) (0.485) (0.484) (0.499) (0.462) (0.502) (0.523) (0.516) (0.554)
PFD x 15,000-19,999 0.661 0.955 1.156∗ 0.941 1.090 −0.275 −0.149 −0.068 −0.381 −0.328
(0.542) (0.604) (0.644) (0.688) (0.688) (0.495) (0.552) (0.594) (0.573) (0.595)
PFD x 20,000-24,999 0.231 0.438 0.384 0.493 0.352 −0.118 0.114 0.038 0.027 −0.066
(0.552) (0.579) (0.633) (0.614) (0.643) (0.492) (0.539) (0.581) (0.561) (0.596)
PFD x 25,000-34,999 −0.671 −0.485 −0.256 −0.367 −0.179 −0.713∗ −0.588 −0.364 −0.598 −0.319
(0.419) (0.472) (0.487) (0.483) (0.491) (0.389) (0.437) (0.453) (0.457) (0.473)
PFD x 35,000-49,999 −0.355 −0.286 −0.226 −0.385 −0.306 −0.688∗ −0.642 −0.557 −0.873∗∗ −0.740∗
(0.411) (0.459) (0.485) (0.459) (0.484) (0.370) (0.410) (0.430) (0.426) (0.446)
PFD x 50,000-74,999 −0.682∗ −0.556 −0.611 −0.588 −0.677 −0.917∗∗∗ −0.889∗∗ −0.944∗∗ −0.997∗∗ −1.065∗∗∗
(0.378) (0.418) (0.446) (0.435) (0.455) (0.332) (0.378) (0.393) (0.397) (0.409)
PFD x 75,000 + −0.055 0.175 0.343 0.187 0.324 −0.452 −0.279 −0.167 −0.389 −0.257
(0.356) (0.400) (0.411) (0.405) (0.405) (0.317) (0.362) (0.374) (0.378) (0.389)
Child characteristics X X X X X X X X
Mother characteristics X X X X
Pre/post natal nutrition X X X X
Observations 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1-5) measure the effect of the PFD on the risk of being
classified obese (BMI ≥ 95th percentile for sex/age) relative to all other weights (BMI < 85th percentile). Columns (6-10) are estimates for
both obese and overweight children relative to all other weight classes. Child characteristics are listed in Table A.1, mother characteristics
are listed in Table A.2, pre/post natal nutrition variables are are listed in Table A.3.
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Table 6: Logit Coefficient Estimates, Conditional on Appliers
Obese Obese & Overweight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total PFDs (’000$) −0.054 −0.195 −0.337∗∗ −0.279∗∗ −0.391∗∗∗ −0.154 −0.235∗∗ −0.327∗∗∗ −0.286∗∗ −0.370∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.128) (0.141) (0.136) (0.147) (0.099) (0.111) (0.121) (0.115) (0.125)
Always Applied −0.010 0.167 0.252 0.084 0.170 0.036 0.082 0.186 −0.0001 0.075
(0.302) (0.333) (0.390) (0.329) (0.386) (0.262) (0.289) (0.331) (0.296) (0.339)
Logit ME at mean -0.009 -0.03 -0.049 -0.041 -0.055 -0.036 -0.048 -0.062 -0.055 -0.067
Child characteristics X X X X X X X X
Mother characteristics X X X X
Pre/post natal nutrition X X X X
Observations 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1-5) measure the effect of the PFD on the risk of being
classified obese (BMI ≥ 95th percentile for sex/age) relative to all other weights (BMI < 85th percentile). Columns (6-10) are estimates for
both obese and overweight children relative to all other weight classes. Child characteristics are listed in Table A.1, mother characteristics
are listed in Table A.2, pre/post natal nutrition variables are are listed in Table A.3.
Table 7: Two-stage Least Squares Estimates of PFD Effect
Obese Obese & Overweight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total PFDs −0.043∗ −0.044∗∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
IV: Eligible PFDs Number Tot. $’s # + avg$ Number Tot. $’s # + avg$
Child characteristics X X X X X X
Mother characteristics X X X X X X
Pre/post natal nutrition X X X X X X
Weak instruments 1286.14*** 2656.6*** 1350.96*** 1286.14*** 2656.6*** 1350.96***
Wu-Hausman 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.6 0 0.01
Sargan NA NA 0.1 NA NA 1.64
Observations 885 885 885 885 885 885
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.156 0.156 0.156
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1-3) measure the effect of the PFD on the risk of being classified
obese (BMI ≥ 95th percentile for sex/age) relative to all other weights (BMI < 85th percentile). Columns (4-6)
are estimates for both obese and overweight children relative to all other weight classes. Child characteristics
are listed in Table A.1, mother characteristics are listed in Table A.2, pre/post natal nutrition variables are
are listed in Table A.3.
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Panels 1, 5, 6, and 10 corresponds to specification 1, 5, 6, and 10 in Table 5. The outcome
for panels 1 and 5 is obese versus all other weight status. The outcome for panels 6 and 10
is obese and overweight versus other weight status. Panels 1 and 6 have no control
variables. Panels 5 and 10 have all controls.
Figure 3: Timeline of PFD and Income Tax Returns
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Table 8: Controlling for Strategic Birth Timing
Obese Obese & Overweight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total PFDs (’000$) −0.051 −0.170 −0.316∗∗ −0.266∗∗ −0.384∗∗∗ −0.148 −0.224∗∗ −0.313∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ −0.370∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.120) (0.133) (0.129) (0.140) (0.094) (0.103) (0.114) (0.108) (0.119)
Intended Timing Preg. −0.305∗ −0.242 0.889∗ −0.107 0.993∗ −0.114 −0.029 0.847∗ 0.138 0.918∗
(0.176) (0.193) (0.525) (0.203) (0.544) (0.147) (0.161) (0.463) (0.171) (0.481)
Logit ME at mean -0.009 -0.026 -0.046 -0.039 -0.054 -0.034 -0.046 -0.059 -0.056 -0.067
Child characteristics X X X X X X X X
Mother characteristics X X X X
Pre/post natal nutrition X X X X
Observations 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1-5) measure the effect of the PFD on the risk of being
classified obese (BMI ≥ 95th percentile for sex/age) relative to all other weights (BMI < 85th percentile). Columns (6-10) are estimates for
both obese and overweight children relative to all other weight classes. Child characteristics are listed in Table A.1, mother characteristics
are listed in Table A.2, pre/post natal nutrition variables are are listed in Table A.3.
Table 9: Birth Timing: Only First and Fourth Quarter Births
Obese Obese & Overweight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total PFDs (’000$) −0.172 −0.363∗ −0.566∗∗ −0.475∗∗ −0.651∗∗ −0.266∗ −0.419∗∗∗ −0.490∗∗∗ −0.464∗∗∗ −0.549∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.196) (0.237) (0.219) (0.255) (0.136) (0.162) (0.185) (0.178) (0.201)
Logit ME at mean -0.029 -0.05 -0.07 -0.062 -0.077 -0.061 -0.082 -0.082 -0.084 -0.085
Child characteristics X X X X X X X X
Mother characteristics X X X X
Pre/post natal nutrition X X X X
Observations 421 421 421 421 421 421 421 421 421 421
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1-5) measure the effect of the PFD on the risk of being
classified obese (BMI ≥ 95th percentile for sex/age) relative to all other weights (BMI < 85th percentile). Columns (6-10) are estimates for
both obese and overweight children relative to all other weight classes. Child characteristics are listed in Table A.1, mother characteristics
are listed in Table A.2, pre/post natal nutrition variables are are listed in Table A.3.
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Table 10: Complete Robustness Specification
Obese Obese & Overweight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total PFDs (’000$) −0.175 −0.418∗∗ −0.623∗∗ −0.552∗∗ −0.730∗∗∗ −0.274∗ −0.446∗∗∗ −0.509∗∗∗ −0.489∗∗∗ −0.558∗∗∗
(0.165) (0.202) (0.247) (0.228) (0.270) (0.143) (0.172) (0.193) (0.186) (0.207)
Always Applied 0.114 0.571 0.680 0.674 0.726 0.139 0.277 0.433 0.231 0.323
(0.459) (0.632) (0.724) (0.650) (0.700) (0.405) (0.507) (0.644) (0.561) (0.659)
Intended Timing Preg. −0.239 −0.146 1.037 −0.035 1.428 −0.192 −0.060 1.085 0.097 1.406
(0.268) (0.319) (0.897) (0.345) (1.048) (0.226) (0.258) (0.833) (0.283) (0.956)
Logit ME at mean -0.029 -0.057 -0.076 -0.071 -0.084 -0.062 -0.087 -0.084 -0.088 -0.085
Child characteristics X X X X X X X X
Mother characteristics X X X X
Pre/post natal nutrition X X X X
Observations 421 421 421 421 421 421 421 421 421 421
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1-5) measure the effect of the PFD on the risk of being
classified obese (BMI ≥ 95th percentile for sex/age) relative to all other weights (BMI < 85th percentile). Columns (6-10) are estimates for
both obese and overweight children relative to all other weight classes. Child characteristics are listed in Table A.1, mother characteristics
are listed in Table A.2, pre/post natal nutrition variables are are listed in Table A.3.
Table 11: Robustness Check, Controlling for Flexible Child Tax Incentives
Obese Obese & Overweight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Total PFDs (’000$) −0.287 −0.418∗∗ −0.579∗∗∗ −0.644∗∗∗ −0.723∗∗∗ −0.191 −0.274 −0.375∗ −0.422∗∗ −0.491∗∗
(0.225) (0.211) (0.221) (0.222) (0.226) (0.191) (0.197) (0.207) (0.200) (0.214)
Logit ME at mean -0.037 -0.049 -0.065 -0.072 -0.079 -0.034 -0.043 -0.056 -0.064 -0.071
Flexible Tax Incentives X X X X X X X X X X
Child characteristics X X X X X X X X
Mother characteristics X X X X
Pre/post natal nutrition X X X X
Observations 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885 885
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1-5) measure the effect of the PFD on the risk of being
classified obese (BMI ≥ 95th percentile for sex/age) relative to all other weights (BMI < 85th percentile). Columns (6-10) are estimates for
both obese and overweight children relative to all other weight classes. Child characteristics are listed in Table A.1, mother characteristics
are listed in Table A.2, pre/post natal nutrition variables are are listed in Table A.3.
Table 12: Childhood Medical-Cost Savings from a $1,000 Universal Cash Transfer
Medical Cost Savings, 4-17
Obesity Effect of Obesity Fully Linear
at 3yos $1k at 3yo Costa Persist Age Decay
Individual 0.203 -0.045 $1,365 $920 $210
95% CI [0.177,0.228] [-0.091,-0.005] [794,2011] [80,2050] [10,500]
AK Cohort 2,230 -500 $10.3m $2.3m
95 CI [1951,2511] [-1003,-51] [1.1,22.7] [0.1,5.5]
95% confidence intervals are in brackets.
a Biener et al. (2017)
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Figure 4: Our estimated unweighted logit coefficient (Point) from Table 2 (col. 1), distri-
bution of 500 placebo effects, and 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles of placebo effects (vertical lines).
Placebo effects estimated by randomly re-assigning each child’s accumulated PFDs by age
3.
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Appendix A Cost-Savings Simulation
The goal of our simulation is to estimate the obesity-caused difference in medical expenditures
for the average cohort of Alaskan-born 3-year-olds, relative to their cost had they been non-
obese. We measure this difference over a 15-year horizon, from 4 through 17 years old.
We then shock this estimate by hypothetically removing some of the PFD money from the
Alaskan cohort that 3-year-olds actually received to see how many additional obesity cases
are created at age three, how these persist into adolescence, and how that may impact
medical expenses.
To project health outcomes, we utilize a standard modeling approach from the literature
and calculate transition probabilities to and from health-status categories. Our estimated
transition probabilities are based on a child’s initial BMI status an the BMI status of their
mothers. As CUBS is not a longitudinal study, we do not observe the actual long run
outcomes of the children surveyed. Instead, we fit a model on data from the National Lon-
gitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the corresponding National Longitudinal Survey of
Children and Young Adults. Using the parameter values from a model fitted to a repre-
sentative U.S. child through age 17, the parameters are used to calculate the transition
probabilities of the average Alaskan cohort in the data. This assumes that the transition
probabilities are similar for the average U.S. child/young adult born to a mother who was
born 1957-1965, to the cohort of children represented in the Alaskan data (after accounting
for child and mother’s BMI status). This assumption is necessary in order to utilize longi-
tudinal data with respondents up to age 17, but we recognize it as a potential limitation.
A.1 Derivation of Expected Medical Cost Savings
Let c1 and c0 denote the average annual medical cost associated with being obese and non-
obese, respectively. Then the expected annual medical cost, Costt, for a child at age t > 3
conditional on the cumulative amount of PFD income received by the age of three is equal
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to:
E(Costt|PFD) = c1P (Obt = 1|PFD) + c0
[
1− P (Obt = 1|PFD)
]
= (c1 − c0)P (Obt = 1|PFD) + c0, (A.1)
where Obt ∈ {0, 1} denotes a child’s obesity status and P (Obt = 1|PFD) denotes the
conditional probability of being obese at age t > 3. The conditional probability of being
obese at age t > 3 depends on whether a child was obese at the age of three and how receiving
PFD influences the likelihood that a child is obese at the age of three. We can incorporate
this relationship be rewriting Eq. (A.1) as:
E(Costt|PFD) =(c1 − c0)
1∑
h=0
P (Obt = 1|Obt=3 = h)P (Obt=3 = h|PFD) + c0,
where P (Obt=3 = h|PFD) represents the influence of PFD on the likelihood of being obese
(or non-obese) at the age of three and P (Obt = 1|Obt=3 = h) denotes the transition proba-
bility representing the likelihood of being obese at age t conditional on having obesity status
h = obese or non-obese at age three.
Now suppose that we are interested in the annual medical-cost savings, St, associated
with an additional $1,000 in cumulative PFD income received by a child by the age of three.
Let PFD = 1 if a child receives an additional $1,000 in PFD and PFD = 0 if a child does
not receive any additional PFD income. Then the expected annual savings for a child at age
t > 3 is equal to:




P (Obt = 1|Obt=3 = h)
[
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where c = (c1−c0) is the annual medical cost of being obese relative to not being obese. The
expression in the brackets is equal to the marginal effect of the PFD on the probability of
being obese or non-obese. Let Rh denote the marginal effect of the PFD on the probability
that a child’s obese status is equal to h ∈ {0, 1}. Then recognizing that R0 = −R1, we can
rewrite the expression in Eq. (A.2) as:
E(St) = c
[
P (Obt = 1|Obt=3 = 1)− P (Obt = 1|Obt=3 = 0)
]
R1, (A.3)
which gives us the expression in Eq. (3) of the main paper. To obtain an estimate of the
expected medical-cost savings from an additional $1,000 in PFD for a cohort of size N over







A.2 Re-weighting to Population and Bootstrapping Confidence
Intervals
Population-weighted estimates and confidence intervals are obtained through a bootstrap
procedure. We take 1,000 sample draws-with-replacement from our data, with draw probabil-
ity corresponding to the survey sample design weights. This sampling procedure re-weights
to survey sample to reflect the population. We estimate Eq. 1 on each of these sample
draws, recording the estimated average marginal effect and the predicted obesity rate. For
each draw, we predict the obesity rate in the counterfactual, having removed $1,000 of PFD
income. Applying the difference of these rates to the Alaska cohort (11,000) yields the num-
ber of averted cases. To estimate cost savings, we sample from of the annual marginal cost
of obesity, taken from the literature Biener et al. (2017) (which we assume is normally dis-
tributed). These costs are multiplied over a 15-year horizon to capture the potential savings
if obesity reductions fully persist through childhood and adolescence. The mean and 95%
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confidence intervals are calculated from the distribution of estimated parameters, predicted
cases and cost savings. Because obesity shocks are not in reality fully persistent (e.g. chil-
dren tend toward the obesity outcomes of their parents), in the next subsection we describe
our procedure to allow the obesity-reduction effect to decay with child age.
A.3 Estimating Age-decay model
To estimate the transitory nature of an obesity shock at age-3, we estimate an obesity
transition model over a 15-year horizon (Eq. 4) on a nationally representative survey dataset,
the National Longitudinal Survey of Children and Young Adults (NLS-CYA). These survey
data are re-weighted to the population by the same bootstrapping procedure outlined in the
previous section. The procedure is modified because NLS-CYA samples mothers and each
of their children, so we account for the clustered nature of the data by sampling from the
household (rather than child) level.
Eq. 4 interacts child age with child’s BMI at age 3 and mother’s BMI, allowing for
the transition probability to change with the child’s age based on their initial continuations
and mother’s weight status. The resulting parameter estimates are presented in Table A.4.
These parameters are used to estimate the likelihood a reduction in obesity at age 3 will be
maintained at each age through age 17. A more flexible interaction of age (discrete age bins)
was also estimated, but yielded similar inference.
Supplementary Tables and Figures
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Table A.1: Child Characteristics: Descriptive Statistics by #PFDs and associated sample
balance tests
1 2 3 Combined P-value
N = 31 N = 492 N = 361 N = 884
Obese 26% ( 8) 22% (108) 22% ( 78) 22% (194) 0.861
Gender: 2 61% ( 19) 51% (250) 47% (171) 50% (440) 0.261
Age (months): 38 55% ( 17) 47% (229) 41% (147) 44% (393) <0.0011
39 32% ( 10) 36% (179) 28% (102) 33% (291)
40 10% ( 3) 14% ( 70) 19% ( 70) 16% (143)
41 3% ( 1) 2% ( 10) 11% ( 39) 6% ( 50)
42 0% ( 0) 1% ( 3) 1% ( 2) 1% ( 5)
43 0% ( 0) 0% ( 1) 0% ( 1) 0% ( 2)
Birth weight (grams) 2188 2494 3316 (2743 ± 900) 2494 3345 3706 (3158 ± 808) 2466 3260 3657 (3095 ± 816) 2466 3300 3670 (3118 ± 817) 0.0162
Birth Defect? (No) 97% ( 30) 97% (475) 97% (351) 97% (856) 0.851
C-SECTION Used 26% ( 8) 28% (139) 28% (102) 28% (249) 0.961
Time In Hosp. After Birth: < 1 DAY 10% ( 3) 7% ( 36) 6% ( 20) 7% ( 59) 0.831
1-2 DAYS 32% ( 10) 47% (230) 49% (176) 47% (416)
3-5 DAYS 26% ( 8) 21% (105) 22% ( 81) 22% (194)
6-14 DAYS 10% ( 3) 6% ( 29) 6% ( 23) 6% ( 55)
MORE THAN 14 DAYS 19% ( 6) 11% ( 55) 11% ( 40) 11% (101)
NOT BORN IN HOSPITAL 3% ( 1) 7% ( 35) 6% ( 20) 6% ( 56)
STILL IN HOSPITAL 0% ( 0) 0% ( 2) 0% ( 1) 0% ( 3)
Gestational Age (Weeks): <28 weeks 3% ( 1) 2% ( 9) 1% ( 3) 1% ( 13) 0.891
28-33 6% ( 2) 7% ( 33) 6% ( 23) 7% ( 58)
34-36 16% ( 5) 14% ( 68) 16% ( 57) 15% (130)
37-42 74% ( 23) 75% (369) 75% (270) 75% (662)
>42 weeks 0% ( 0) 3% ( 13) 2% ( 8) 2% ( 21)
Place of Birth : HOSPITAL 97% ( 30) 91% (450) 93% (337) 92% (817) 0.521
BIRTHING CENTER 3% ( 1) 7% ( 32) 6% ( 21) 6% ( 54)
RESIDENCE 0% ( 0) 2% ( 10) 1% ( 3) 1% ( 13)
Region : Anch 32% ( 10) 42% (206) 39% (141) 40% (357) 0.731
Gulf Coast 16% ( 5) 10% ( 49) 9% ( 32) 10% ( 86)
Interior 19% ( 6) 16% ( 80) 14% ( 51) 15% (137)
Northern 0% ( 0) 3% ( 15) 4% ( 13) 3% ( 28)
Southeast 6% ( 2) 8% ( 39) 11% ( 39) 9% ( 80)
Southwest 6% ( 2) 8% ( 40) 8% ( 29) 8% ( 71)
Mat-Su 19% ( 6) 13% ( 63) 16% ( 56) 14% (125)
Joint F-test for significance: 0.6891 on 22 and 861 DF, p-value: 0.8534
Variables not included in child controls, but shown for description:
Number PFD Entitled : 3 13% ( 4) 9% ( 42) 100% (361) 46% (407) <0.0011
Height (inches)? 37.0 37.5 38.9 (38.0 ± 2.3) 36.5 37.5 39.0 (37.6 ± 2.3) 36.0 37.8 39.0 (37.5 ± 2.3) 36.5 37.5 39.0 (37.6 ± 2.3) 0.922
Weight 32.0 35.0 38.0 (35.1 ± 4.5) 30.8 34.0 37.0 (34.2 ± 5.2) 30.0 33.0 37.0 (33.8 ± 5.6) 30.0 33.6 37.0 (34.0 ± 5.4) 0.142
Month of Birth (numeric) 4.0 5.0 7.0 ( 5.4 ± 2.7) 3.0 4.0 6.0 ( 4.5 ± 2.5) 9.0 10.0 11.0 ( 9.9 ± 1.6) 4.0 7.0 10.0 ( 6.7 ± 3.4) <0.0012
Month of Birth dummy : 1 10% ( 3) 12% (60) 0% ( 0) 7% (63) <0.0011
2 3% ( 1) 11% (54) 0% ( 0) 6% (55)
3 10% ( 3) 13% (65) 0% ( 0) 8% (68)
4 16% ( 5) 17% (86) 0% ( 0) 10% (91)
5 13% ( 4) 13% (65) 0% ( 0) 8% (69)
6 19% ( 6) 13% (65) 2% ( 9) 9% (80)
7 13% ( 4) 12% (60) 6% (20) 10% (84)
8 6% ( 2) 1% ( 7) 15% (54) 7% (63)
9 3% ( 1) 1% ( 7) 19% (68) 9% (76)
10 0% ( 0) 1% ( 4) 16% (59) 7% (63)
11 3% ( 1) 1% ( 7) 21% (76) 10% (84)
12 3% ( 1) 2% (12) 21% (75) 10% (88)
a b c represent the lower quartile a, the median b, and the upper quartile c for continuous vari-
ables. x±s represents X̄±1 SD.Numbers after percents are frequencies.Tests used:1Pearson
test; 2Kruskal-Wallis test
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Table A.2: Mother Characteristics: Descriptive Statistics by #PFDs and associated sample
balance tests
1 2 3 Combined P-value
N = 31 N = 492 N = 361 N = 884
Race : NH/OPI 3% ( 1) 3% ( 14) 3% ( 10) 3% ( 25) 0.191
White 65% ( 20) 64% (317) 63% (226) 64% (563)
Other, (inc. Black, Asian) 10% ( 3) 4% ( 22) 5% ( 19) 5% ( 44)
AI/AN 19% ( 6) 26% (129) 29% (106) 27% (241)
unknown 3% ( 1) 2% ( 10) 0% ( 0) 1% ( 11)
Non-Hispanic : Yes 87% ( 27) 96% (470) 95% (344) 95% (841) 0.11
Mother age at delivery: <20 10% ( 3) 6% ( 31) 5% ( 19) 6% ( 53) 0.171
20-24 13% ( 4) 17% ( 83) 22% ( 81) 19% (168)
25-29 42% ( 13) 34% (166) 31% (113) 33% (292)
30-34 19% ( 6) 31% (151) 25% ( 89) 28% (246)
35-39 13% ( 4) 11% ( 54) 13% ( 47) 12% (105)
40+ 3% ( 1) 1% ( 7) 3% ( 12) 2% ( 20)
Household Income: ≤ $10,000 19% ( 6) 12% ( 58) 11% ( 41) 12% (105) 0.561
$10,000 - $14,999 10% ( 3) 4% ( 21) 7% ( 25) 6% ( 49)
$15,000 - $19,999 10% ( 3) 3% ( 17) 5% ( 18) 4% ( 38)
$20,000 - $24,999 6% ( 2) 7% ( 32) 6% ( 23) 6% ( 57)
$25,000 - $34,999 3% ( 1) 9% ( 46) 10% ( 35) 9% ( 82)
$35,000 - $49,999 13% ( 4) 14% ( 69) 14% ( 51) 14% (124)
$50,000 - $74,999 19% ( 6) 19% ( 92) 16% ( 56) 17% (154)
≥$75,000 19% ( 6) 32% (157) 31% (112) 31% (275)
Household Size 2.0 3.0 3.0 (2.6 ±1.1) 2.0 3.0 4.0 (2.9 ±1.3) 2.0 3.0 4.0 (3.0 ±1.4) 2.0 3.0 4.0 (3.0 ±1.4) 0.442
Marital status at birth: Unmarried 32% ( 10) 31% (153) 34% (124) 32% (287) 0.61
Mom BMI before preg. 23.0 26.2 30.1 (27.0 ± 5.8) 21.8 24.9 29.1 (26.1 ± 5.8) 22.1 25.1 29.3 (26.5 ± 6.1) 21.9 25.0 29.2 (26.3 ± 5.9) 0.472
Trying to Get Pregnant: Yes 45% ( 14) 57% (279) 58% (211) 57% (504) 0.351
Gestational diabetes: Yes 6% ( 2) 10% ( 47) 12% ( 42) 10% ( 91) 0.471
Drank last 3 month preg:: Yes 61% ( 19) 62% (306) 64% (232) 63% (557) 0.811
Smoked last 3 month preg: Yes 13% ( 4) 13% ( 65) 13% ( 46) 13% (115) 0.981
Wanted to get Preg: Sooner 13% ( 4) 22% (106) 20% ( 73) 21% (183) 0.551
Later 42% ( 13) 27% (133) 27% ( 96) 27% (242)
Then 39% ( 12) 45% (219) 44% (160) 44% (391)
Did not want 6% ( 2) 7% ( 34) 9% ( 32) 8% ( 68)
WIC Assistance – dur preg : Yes 48% ( 15) 37% (182) 42% (151) 39% (348) 0.211
F-statistic: 1.091 on 26 and 829 DF, p-value: 0.3448
a b c represent the lower quartile a, the median b, and the upper quartile c for continuous vari-
ables. x±s represents X̄±1 SD.Numbers after percents are frequencies.Tests used:1Pearson
test; 2Kruskal-Wallis test
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Table A.3: Early Nutrition: Descriptive Statistics by #PFDs and associated sample balance
tests
1 2 3 Combined P-value
N = 31 N = 492 N = 361 N = 884
Kessner Index : Adequate PNC 55% ( 17) 61% (299) 61% (222) 61% (538) 0.381
Intermediate PNC 19% ( 6) 25% (122) 27% ( 97) 25% (225)
Inadequate PNC 6% ( 2) 5% ( 26) 4% ( 14) 5% ( 42)
Unknown PNC 19% ( 6) 9% ( 45) 8% ( 28) 9% ( 79)
Breastfeeding : Still at PRAMS 65% ( 20) 72% (354) 67% (241) 70% (615) 0.221
First week for food (if ate yet) 0.0 0.0 15.5 ( 6.1 ± 7.9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 3.4 ± 6.7) 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 2.9 ± 6.2) 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 3.3 ± 6.6) 0.0342
Did eat food 61% ( 19) 78% (382) 80% (290) 78% (691) 0.0441
First week drank liquid (if drank yet) 0.0 0.0 5.0 (3.1 ±4.8) 0.0 0.0 4.0 (2.9 ±5.2) 0.0 0.0 3.0 (2.3 ±4.1) 0.0 0.0 4.0 (2.7 ±4.8) 0.62
Did drink liquid : Yes 19% ( 6) 36% (178) 35% (126) 35% (310) 0.161
Mom drank last 3 months preg.: Yes 61% ( 19) 62% (306) 64% (232) 63% (557) 0.811
Mom smoked last 3 months preg: Yes 13% ( 4) 13% ( 65) 13% ( 46) 13% (115) 0.981
Mom Did smoke: No 94% ( 29) 88% (434) 86% (312) 88% (775) 0.441
F-statistic: 1.573 on 11 and 872 DF, p-value: 0.1014
a b c represent the lower quartile a, the median b, and the upper quartile c for continuous vari-
ables. x±s represents X̄±1 SD.Numbers after percents are frequencies.Tests used:1Pearson
test; 2Kruskal-Wallis test
Table A.4: Persistence Regression Model
Logit Coef. Std dev 5th 95th
(Intercept) -16.52 0.09 -16.61 -16.35
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01
Obt=3 = 1 4.13 0.41 3.33 4.95
Obt=3 = 1 x Age -0.23 0.05 -0.33 -0.15
BMImtr = Normal 13.29 0.28 12.68 13.80
BMImtr = Normal x Age 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.10
BMImtr = Overweight 13.66 0.35 12.98 14.32
BMImtr = Overweight x Age 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.10
BMImtr = Obese 14.59 0.34 13.91 15.22
BMImtr = Obese x Age 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.08
Standard deviation and confidence intervals are bootstrapped, with samples clustered at the household
level.
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